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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 930436-CA 
DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft of lost, mislaid 
or mistakenly delivered property, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (1990) . This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to 
dismiss for cause a juror who was related by marriage to a 
prosecution witness? 
Where counsel for the defense challenges a juror for cause, 
the decision to remove the juror is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court. State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 
1989); accord State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
2. Was the evidence adduced by the State sufficient to 
1 
support the jury's verdict of guilty? 
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient 
evidence when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
3. Did the trial court exercise proper discretion by 
sentencing defendant without a presentence report where: a) 
defendant absconded from the jurisdiction soon after the court 
ordered a presentence report; and, 2) defendant, after returning 
under an extradition order, stated through his attorney that he 
wanted no further delays in his sentencing? 
An appellate court "does not disturb a sentence unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused 
its discretion." State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986). 
"An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge 
in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 
'clearly excessive sentence." State v. Russell, 791 P. 2d 188, 192-
93 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407, governing theft of lost, mislaid, 
or mistakenly delivered property, provides: 
A person commits theft when: 
(1) He obtains property of another which he 
knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have 
been delivered under a mistake as to the 
2 
identity of the recipient or as to the nature 
or amount of the property, without taking 
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; 
and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner 
of the property when he obtains the property 
or at any time prior to taking the measures 
designated in paragraph (1). 
Rule 18(e) (4) and (14), governing selection of jury, provides: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of 
the following grounds: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any 
party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the 
defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable 
minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A 
prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is 
indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof. . .. 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging. • .. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of theft of lost, mislaid 
or mistakenly delivered property for appropriating a set of golf 
clubs, which he later passed on to another individual (R. 1-2) . 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 97) . 
He subsequently failed to contact Adult Probation and Parole for 
purposes of preparing a presentence report, as ordered by the 
3 
court, and left the jurisdiction (Tr. of 1/25/93 at 160; Tr. of 
2/24/93 at 3-4) . Ultimately, defendant returned to the 
jurisdiction under an extradition order, at which time he was 
sentenced to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (Tr. of 
6/16/93 at 2, 6; R. 105-06). This timely appeal followed (R. 108-
09) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After returning from a Moab High School golf team trip, Derek 
Daye walked over to City Market and left his set of golf clubs in 
front of the store while he went inside to call his father for a 
ride home (Tr. of January 25, 1993 at 51-52) .x When he returned, 
the golf clubs were gone (Tr. 53) . Derek testified that he saw 
defendant near the high school when he arrived back from the golf 
club trip and then, again, by the market before he went in to make 
the telephone call (Tr. 56). 
Defendant, who had been "living on the river all summer, " 
testified that he found the set of golf clubs in a ditch or creek 
behind the high school and that the glare of the clubs sticking out 
of a plastic garbage bag caught his eye (Tr. 114, 116-17, 123) . He 
assumed the clubs were discarded, stating, "I didn't figure no one 
would be interested in some trash laying in the ditch" (R. 117). 
According to defendant, he left the clubs there, returning to get 
them a few days later after he had told an acquaintance who golfed 
where the clubs were and that individual, Billy Williams, was 
1
 Hereafter, the trial transcript, dated January 25, 1993, 
will be referred to as "Tr.". Any other referenced transcript will 
include the date of the proceeding as an identifier. 
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unable to locate them (Tr. 115) . Defendant then put the clubs 
under Williams' trailer, and Williams later offered defendant $20 
for the set (Tr. 115-16) . 
Billy Williams testified that defendant told him he found the 
clubs by the creek, that defendant offered to sell the set for $50, 
that defendant left the clubs under the trailer for his inspection, 
and that he paid defendant $25 for the set (Tr. 67, 69). 
The clubs were ultimately recovered while Billy Williams was 
playing golf at the Moab golf course (Tr. 90, 96). Williams had 
broken a club and thrown it away (Tr. 72) . A range boy recognized 
it as one of Derek Daye's stolen clubs, retrieved it, and turned it 
over to Glen Richeson, the course golf pro (Tr. 90) . The sheriff's 
department was called in, and the clubs were recovered from Billy 
Williams (Tr. 90, 96). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss juror 
Hopper for cause. First, defendant has made an understandable 
error in reading the transcript, mistakenly thinking the voir dire 
of juror Hopper ended in an equivocal response about his 
impartiality, thus raising an inference of bias. The amended 
transcript, however, clearly establishes both that the voir dire of 
Hopper ended sooner than defense counsel thought and that Hopper 
definitively expressed that he could independently assess the 
testimony. See Addendum A. Second, defendant waived any objection 
to juror Hopper's presence on the jury by failing to remove him 
with a peremptory challenge, instead using his peremptories on 
5 
jurors against whom there had been no for-cause challenges. To 
claim error on appeal based on a juror whose presence defendant 
tacitly ratified is an inconsistency raising the spectre of invited 
error. Such a claim must fail. 
Defendant's second argument, that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury verdict, fails for two reasons. 
First, the victim's inability to identify defendant from a photo 
array was not dispositive as to any elements of the crime for which 
defendant was found guilty. And second, even if the victim's 
inability to identify defendant from the photo array rendered his 
testimony suspect, that does not necessarily mean that the jury 
would have believed defendant's version of the events and acquitted 
him. 
Defendant's final argument, that the trial court abused its 
discretion by sentencing him without a presentence report, is also 
without merit. Defendant fled the jurisdiction immediately after 
trial, thus precluding preparation of a presentence report. 
Furthermore, after extradition back to Utah, he stated through his 
attorney that he wanted to be sentenced right away. Under such 
circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion in 
acting as it did. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS JUROR 
HOPPER FOR CAUSE DID NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR 
During voir dire, the court asked the venire as a whole: "Is 
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there anyone that -- that is on this potential jury panel that has 
either a personal or a friendly relationship with either the --
either counsel here, the defendant, or the witnesses in the way of 
a social relationship, I guess?" (Tr. 26) . Ray Dean Hopper 
responded that his daughter was married to the son of witness Glen 
Richeson, the golf pro at the Moab golf course. The court then 
questioned Hopper in order to establish whether he would give 
Richeson's testimony undue weight. Hopper indicated that he would 
not (Tr. 27). Subsequently, defense counsel challenged juror 
Hopper for cause, "based on his relationship, Mr. Richeson's son 
and his daughter" (Tr. 30). The court ruled against defendant. 
(Tr. 31) . The parties then exercised their peremptory challenges. 
Although defendant exhausted her challenges, she chose not to 
strike juror Hopper (R. 96). 
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error by failing to either remove juror Hopper for cause 
or fully question him to rebut what defendant claims was an 
inference of bias. Furthermore, he argues that even if he had not 
used all of his peremptory challenges on other jurors, he would 
have been prejudiced by having to exercise a peremptory to remove 
a juror who should have been removed for cause (Br. of App. at 8) . 
Defendant's claim fails for two reasons, one factual and one 
legal. First, defendant has misread the record, basing his 
argument on the factually incorrect belief that juror Hopper's 
concluding statement as to whether he could fairly judge all of the 
testimony was: "I -- I guess not, probably not" (Br. of App. at 4 
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(citing Tr. 28)) . Defendant uses this statement to argue that the 
inference of bias raised by the relationship between the juror's 
daughter and the witness's son had not been dispelled: "In the 
instant case, after the Court's inquiry was completed, the 
challenged juror, far from being rehabilitated allowed as to how he 
could probably not judge all of the testimony presented 
impartially" (Br. of App. at 7-8). 
Defendant's argument is based on a mistaken reading of the 
record. He has confused the subsequent voir dire of a female juror 
with the earlier voir dire of juror Hopper. Because many jurors 
were labelled simply as "unidentified juror" in the original voir 
dire transcript, defendant's mistake is understandable. The 
supplemental transcript, however, unequivocally resolves the 
confusion. See Addendum A. 
During voir dire, after the court asked if anyone had a social 
or personal relationship with defendant, either counsel, or any of 
the witnesses, the court and juror Hopper engaged in the following 
interchange, reproduced here in its entirety: 
Juror: Mr. Glen Richeson, I know. My son and his 
daughter are married. I know them quite well. 
The Court: Does -- but does the relationship that you 
have with him, would it -- would it make you 
tend to believe him, his testimony as opposed 
to the testimony of someone else here? 
Unfairly. You know, I mean without --
Juror: I don't know --
The Court: I mean, if you didn't believe him, could you 
go ahead and decide the case on the basis of 
not believing his testimony and proceed? 
Juror: No. 
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The Court: You think that the fact of that relationship 
that you have with him and through your 
families is — is such that you would just 
tend to have to believe his testimony as 
opposed to testimony that might be 
controvert his testimony; is that correct? 
Juror: Well, no, I don't believe it would make any 
difference. 
The Court: You don't think it would make any difference? 
You'd just listen to the testimony and make up 
your own mind on the basis of the testimony 
and/or the conflicts in the testimony? 
Juror: Yes. 
The Court: Okay. 
(Tr. 27) . This exchange was plainly intended to explore whether 
juror Hopper would accord undue weight to Glen Richeson's testimony 
and whether he could judge all of the testimony impartially. 
Admittedly, the court's questioning begins somewhat unartfully. 
Its second question is marked by a perplexing double negative, and 
juror Hopper's answer, in the context of the entire exchange, 
indicates that he may well have been confused by the court's 
wording of its inquiry. As the conversation continues and the 
court expresses itself more plainly, however, juror Hopper's 
responses become increasingly unequivocal. At the end of the 
exchange, both parties seem clear that Hopper will independently 
assess the testimony. Under the circumstances, the court was 
within its discretion in seating the juror because any inference of 
bias stemming from his relationship with Glen Richeson had been 
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rebutted.2 
Second, in any event, defendant's claim must fail because he 
is legally incorrect in asserting that "' it is prejudicial error to 
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a jury 
panel member who should have been removed for cause. ' " Br. of App. 
at 8 (quoting State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citation omitted)). Under the line of cases that developed from 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), and on which 
defendant relies, prejudice was presumed and reversal was 
automatic. State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 1994). 
Defendant, however, has ignored the Utah Supreme Court's recent 
holding that " [t]o prevail on a claim of error based on the failure 
to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate 
prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or 
incompetent." Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 (citation 
omitted). 
The claim in Menzies involved several jurors who were removed 
by peremptory challenge after the trial court refused to remove 
them for cause. Defendant argued that forcing defense counsel to 
use peremptories in this manner constituted reversible error. Id. 
Defendant's claim failed because he relied on the old automatic 
reversal rule and did not carry his burden of demonstrating how the 
2
 As matters evolved, Glen Richeson testified only as to the 
value of the golf clubs (Tr. 89-94) . He did not testify about the 
substantive elements of the crime with which defendant was charged. 
See State v. Lacev, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983) (court notes that 
witnesses with whom juror had relationship did not offer testimony 
crucial to State's case nor was their credibility questioned). 
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forced use of his peremptory challenges rendered the jury partial 
or biased. Id. at 26. 
The instant case differs from Menzies in that defendant chose 
not to remove juror Hopper with a peremptory challenge, instead 
using her peremptories on other jurors and allowing juror Hopper to 
be seated. Juror Hopper was not forced on defendant.3 
Under such circumstances, counsel's course of action should be 
held on appeal to operate as a waiver of any objection to Hopper's 
presence on the jury. The United States Supreme Court, in 
approving such a rule, has stated: 
[A]lthough Oklahoma provides a capital 
defendant with nine peremptory challenges, 
this grant is qualified by the requirement 
that the defendant must use those challenges 
to cure erroneous refusals by the trial court 
to excuse jurors for cause. We think there is 
nothing arbitrary or irrational about such a 
requirement, which subordinates the absolute 
freedom to use a peremptory challenge as one 
wishes to the goal of empaneling an impartial 
jury. 
Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 81, 90 (1988). This "cure it or waive 
it" rule, although not specifically addressed in Menzies because 
the jurors were removed by peremptory challenge, follows naturally 
from it and other settled precedent. 
To claim error on appeal based on a juror whose presence on 
the jury defendant tacitly approved is an inconsistency that 
"smacks of invited error, which is 'procedurally unjustified and 
3
 Indeed, juror Hopper was the sole juror challenged for 
cause by defense counsel. Thus, defendant could have allowed any 
of the other jurors whom she challenged peremptorily to sit, 
without thereby creating a partial jury. 
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viewed with disfavor.'11 Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 
1994), petition for cert, filed, (U.S. Jul. 18, 1994) (No. 94-
5235), citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987). 
Under such circumstances, defendant's claim must fail. 
POINT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF 
GUILTY 
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient 
evidence when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543 (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d at 
444) . Defendant asserts that the inability of Derek Daye, the 
victim, to identify defendant in a photo array as the man he had 
seen by the high school and at City Market on the evening the golf 
clubs were taken rendered his subsequent identification of 
defendant at trial "inherently improbable." Defendant summarily 
concludes that absent Derek's unbelievable testimony, the jury 
would probably have believed defendant's testimony and found him 
not guilty (Br. of App. at 12) . 
This argument also fails for two reasons. First, Derek Daye's 
identification of defendant as someone who was in the area when the 
clubs were taken was not the linchpin of the case. The statute 
governing theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property 
requires that a person "obtains property of another which he knows 
to have been lost or mislaid. . .." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407(1) 
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(1992). There was no factual dispute about defendant "obtaining" 
the property. Indeed, defendant himself admitted that he found the 
golf clubs in a ditch and later retrieved them (Tr. 114, 118) . All 
the jury had to believe of Derek's testimony was that when he 
returned from telephoning his father, the golf clubs were gone. 
Derek Daye's inability to identify defendant from a photo array is 
not dispositive as to any of the elements of the crime for which 
the jury found defendant guilty. 
Second, even if Derek's inability to identify defendant from 
the photo array rendered his testimony suspect, that does not 
necessarily mean that the jury would have believed defendant's 
version of the events. Derek and defendant were not the only 
witnesses to testify at trial. Derek's father, two law enforcement 
officers, the golf pro, Billy Williams, and a neighbor of Williams' 
also testified. The testimony of these witnesses was consistent in 
establishing that: defendant obtained the set of golf clubs that 
Derek Daye lost (Tr. 101, 110); defendant sold the clubs to Billy 
Williams, who thought they might be "hot" (Tr. 67-69, 107-08); a 
range boy at the Moab golf course found a broken club that he 
believed was one of Derek's (Tr. 90); the golf pro called the 
police (Tr. 90) ; the police recovered the clubs from Billy Williams 
on the Moab golf course (Tr. 90, 96). 
With these facts in mind, the question for the jury was 
whether defendant, when he obtained the clubs, knew they had been 
lost or mislaid and "had the purpose to deprive the owner of the 
13 
property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (2) .4 While defendant 
testified that he thought the clubs were "trash," his subsequent 
action of delivering them to a golfer acquaintance, whether as a 
sale or a gift, flies in the face of his earlier assessment of them 
as worthless (Tr. 117-19). A jury could reasonably infer from 
defendant's action that he knew the clubs had been lost or mislaid. 
An equally reasonable inference is that, by delivering the clubs to 
another party who did not own them, he demonstrated an intent "to 
deprive the owner of the property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407(2) . 
It is, of course, the jury's prerogative both to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. State 
v. Martinez, 709 P.2d 355, 356 (Utah 1985). It is not defense 
counsel's role, and it is not this Court's role. Certainly, if the 
jury had believed defendant's version of events and disbelieved all 
the other witnesses, it could have acquitted him. But the jury 
chose not to do so, and defendant has not shown how the evidence 
and inferences that may properly be drawn from it are so 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). Under such circumstances, this Court should 
not disturb the jury's decision. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 
(Utah App. 1990). Accord State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
4
 As to the other statutory elements of the crime, 
defendant's testimony clearly established that he obtained the 
property of another (R. 114) and that he made no attempt to return 
the property to the owner (R. 117-20) . See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
407. 
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1985). 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT WITHOUT A PRESENTENCE 
REPORT WHERE DEFENDANT: 1) FLED THE 
JURISDICTION AFTER TRIAL, THUS PRECLUDING THE 
PREPARATION OF A PRESENTENCE REPORT; AND 2) 
STATED THROUGH HIS ATTORNEY, AFTER 
EXTRADITION, THAT HE WANTED TO BE SENTENCED 
RIGHT AWAY 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him because, while the court initially agreed that a 
presentence report would be appropriate, it eventually sentenced 
him without the benefit of that document. In essence, he argues 
that the court's "rescission" of its order constituted an abuse of 
discretion (Br. of App. at 13). 
Defendant, however, has failed to consider the intervening 
events between the initial order for a presentence report and the 
eventual sentence. On the date set for sentencing, defendant 
failed to appear. His counsel reported that he had left the 
jurisdiction immediately after trial and was at the Open Door 
Mission in Omaha, Nebraska. She recommended that he be allowed to 
continue in that year-long program, reasoning: "I'm sure that if he 
finds out now that he's being extradited and probably going to 
prison, he's going to flee that program" (Tr. of February 24, 1992 
hearing at 2). She later added: " [I]f he knows they're coming to 
get him to take him to prison, he's probably going to move" (Id. at 
3) . She also argued that, while defendant did know that he was 
supposed to appear for sentencing, he may not have known he was 
supposed to contact Adult Probation and Parole for presentence 
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report purposes (Id. at 4-5) . She admitted, however, that the 
reason defendant may not have known about his obligation to contact 
Adult Probation and Parole was that he had fled the jurisdiction 
(Id. at 4) . 
Defendant was eventually extradited back to Utah, where he 
appeared in court for sentencing. After urging the court to once 
again refer the case to Adult Probation and Parole for a 
presentence report, defense counsel engaged in the following 
exchange with the court: 
D. Counsel: Then I had hoped that while he was 
awaiting extradition, that Mr. Thayne 
would conduct presentence report [sic], 
and that was my understanding, so I was 
surprised to find out that one had not 
been done, I believe that would have been 
helpful; however, Mr. Schultz feels that 
if you are going to send him to prison, 
you know, regardless --
The Court: Better now than later, huh? 
D. Counsel: -- he'd like to get going. 
(Tr. of June 16, 1993 hearing at 3.) Prior to imposing sentence, 
and after the prosecution had recommended immediate commitment to 
prison, the court stated: "Well, that's my inclination, Mr. 
Schultz, under these circumstances. If there's — if there's an 
attitude of cooperation shown, the Court generally wants to hear 
all sides, but where -- where you have left the area after trial 
and conviction by a jury, I'm going to -- impose the statutory --
[sic]11 (Id. at 3-4) .5 The court then sentenced defendant to zero 
5
 At this juncture, counsel argued that defendant tried to 
stay in contact with the court through a Nebraska attorney after he 
left Utah (Tr. of February 24, 1993 hearing at 4-5) . However, 
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to five years in the Utah State Prison (Id. at 6). 
In order for the court's sentencing decision emerging from 
this fact pattern to constitute an abuse of discretion, defendant 
must show that the sentence was either clearly excessive or 
inherently unfair. Russell, 791 P.2d at 192-93. Counsel has 
conceded that the sentence was within legal limits, arguing only 
that "[t]he reason that such revocation is arbitrary and reversible 
is because it is based on emotion and contempt for Defendant rather 
than on the basis of a prepared report" (Br. of App. at 13). The 
court, however, made clear that it based its decision to forego the 
presentence report on defendant's voluntary act of absconding from 
the jurisdiction following conviction. Furthermore, the statute 
governing presentence investigation reports states: "Prior to the 
imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of 
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections 
or information from other sources about the defendant." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (4) (a) (1990) (emphasis added). In this case, after 
defendant had been extradited back to Utah, counsel clearly 
represented that her client did not concur in any action that would 
further delay his sentencing. 
Defendant's flouting of judicial process, coupled with the 
expressed desire to move along to the sentencing after he was 
counsel never addressed the primary focus of the court's concern --
defendant's prior act of fleeing the jurisdiction. 
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extradited, constituted a reasonable and adequate basis for the 
court's decision. Because defendant has failed to show that the 
sentence was inherently unfair, the determination of the trial 
court should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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of the witnesses. I know that Ms. Nelson mentioned that she 
was neighbors of the Dayes. I think we need to find out if 
there are any friendships or acquaintances that might affect 
them, either with counsel or with witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, I thought that I had tried to do 
that with the preliminary statements and questions that I made. 
Is there anyone that--that is on this potential jury 
panel that has either a personal or a friendly relationship 
with either the--either counsel here, the defendant, or the 
witnesses in the way of a social relationship, I guess? 
Let's start here with--
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I'm a student of--or rather, 
Derek Daye's a student of I've known Mr. Richeson for about ten 
years. 
THE COURT: Yes? 
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I'm a member of the Rotary Club 
which Ms. Starley also is a member of. 
MS. STARLEY: Or will be, today. 
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: Or will be. 
THE COURT: Let's--
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE) : Mr. Glen Richeson, I know. 
My son and his daughter are married. I know them quite well. 
THE COURT: Does--but does the relationship that you 
have with him, would it--would it make you tend to believe him, 
25 I his testimony as opposed to the testimony of someone else here? 
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1 Unfairly. You know, I mean without-
2 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): I don't know-
3 THE COURT: I mean, if you didn't believe him, could 
4 you 9° ahead and decide the case on the basis of not believing 
5 his testimony and proceed? 
6 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): No. 
7 THE COURT: You think that the fact of that 
9 relationship that you have with him and through your families 
9 I is--is such that you would just tend to have to believe his 
20 | testimony as opposed to testimony that might be--controvert his 
22 I testimony; is that correct? 
12 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): Well, no, I don't believe 
23 it would make any difference. 
THE COURT: You don't think it would make any 
difference? You'd just listen to the testimony and make up 
your own mind on the basis of the testimony and/or the 
conflicts in the testimony? 
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Yes? 
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (FEMALE): I've known Glen for 
about eight, nine years, too. We've kind of worked together at 
the hospital and stuff, and it might--honestly, it might make 
a difference 'cause I think he's a real, fair, honest person, 
so see, it might make a difference to me, what he says. I 
don't know. Honestly I don't know, but it's a good possibility. 
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